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Abstract 
Women’s education has emerged as a central predictor of fertility decline, but the multiple 
possible mechanisms by which education can affect fertility have not been subject to detailed 
comparative investigation across multiple sites. In this paper, we use structural equation modelling to
examine potential pathways between education and fertility in three different geographic locations: 
Matlab, Bangladesh; San Borja, Bolivia; and rural Poland. Using a comparable set of variables we 
show that the pathways by which education affects fertility differ in important ways, yet also show
key similarities. In particular, we find that across all three contexts, education affects age at first birth 
via women’s work, but this pathway only influences fertility in rural Poland. In Matlab and San 
Borja, education is associated with lower local childhood mortality which influences the number of 
births, but this pathway is not important in rural Poland. The similarities across sites suggest that 
common elements are important in how education drives demographic transitions cross-culturally, 
but the differences suggest that local ecologies also play an important role in the relationship between 
education and fertility decline.
Main Text 
Introduction
The Demographic Transition, a change from high mortality and fertility to low fertility and
mortality, has now occurred throughout much of the world (1–4). While researchers generally agree 
on the reasons we see reductions in mortality, there remains significant debate on why fertility rates
have declined. The dramatic reduction in fertility appears perplexing evolutionarily, particularly as
people have access to more resources than ever before in developed economies (4–6). Additionally, 
high-status or wealthy individuals tend to be the first adopters of the low-fertility strategy in a
fertility transition, which is the opposite of what is seen in traditional hunter-gatherer and
horticultural societies where fertility is positively correlated with status (7,8). While many 
hypotheses about fertility decline have been developed and tested, very little work has focused on
cross-cultural comparisons of the process or the mechanisms by which different predictors of fertility 
decline actually influence fertility outcomes.
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Here we take a broad biosocial approach drawing on both life history theory and cultural 
evolutionary theory to understand fertility decision-making. Life history theory seeks to understand 
how evolutionary forces shape organisms’ life stages, such as growth, age at maturity, reproductive 
pace, clutch size, amount of parental investment, and senescence to optimize fitness. This body of 
theory provides predictions about how individuals face trade-offs in the allocation of resources to 
different productive and reproductive goals. One fundamental trade-off that all organisms face is 
whether to allocate energy towards the self, for example, by growing or investing in immune 
function, or towards reproduction, with the assumption that allocating energy towards oneself today 
should pay-off by increasing the probability of being able to produce successful offspring in the 
future (9,10). Cultural evolutionary theory, in contrast, seeks to understand how some beliefs and 
attitudes spread and persist, while others disappear, and how rules about learning evolved to enhance 
fitness scale up to produce group level patterns (11,12).  
While modern low fertility behaviour is likely maladaptive (13,14), we expect that people use 
decision rules that have been subject to natural selection, and which may maximize reproductive 
success in other environments. Cultural evolution may also influence fertility decisions in ways that 
do not presuppose adaptive reproductive behaviour (15).   
The Role of Education
Education has long been recognized as a strong predictor of a woman’s fertility (16–18).  
Higher educational achievement is associated with delayed marriage (16) and reduced family size 
(19,20), although this relationship is not always straightforward. Very early in a transition, small 
increases in education can actually increase fertility rates in some contexts, but beyond primary 
school, education is generally associated with declining fertility rates (21).  While we know that 
educational levels are negatively associated with family size in many cultures, we do not know the 
mechanisms by which this occurs.   
Previous research has typically categorised models of fertility decline into economic or 
‘investment’ models, and cultural transmission models. Economic models focus on the individual 
costs and benefits of producing children and the trade-off between the quantity and quality of 
children (22–26). This approach focuses on how, in the course of economic development, children 
tend to become more ‘expensive’, via increased schooling rates (19), opportunity costs for women 
(27,28), reduced child mortality rates (29), and changing labour markets (30). Modern labour markets 
require skills that tend to be acquired in more formal educational settings, forcing parents to invest 
more to produce quality offspring. Cultural transmission hypotheses instead often focus on whether 
and how people incorporate the ideas and behaviours of others when making reproductive decisions 
(6,11,31,32).  People may be able to learn about different reproductive strategies through social 
interactions with their close social network (32,33), from high-status individuals in their communities 
(who may be viewed as successful and tend to be the first adopters of low-fertility behaviour;
(12,34)), or via the diffusion of ideas from further afield, which may be transmitted through mass 
media (35,36). Most researchers currently agree that both cultural transmission and economic 
conditions influence reproductive decision-making and that they interact with each other, since 
cultural changes influence available economic opportunities and changing cultural norms may be 
initiated by individuals who recognize and respond to the changing costs of reproduction (5,6,33).   
In particular, the relationship between education and fertility is likely mediated by both the 
economic and cultural transmission pathways of fertility decline (5,6,33). Education influences many 
aspects of a person’s life that might lead to reduced fertility. Three broad mechanisms include: a) 
environmental risk management, b) increases in human capital investment, and c) changes in the 
cultural traits one is exposed to. These first two mechanisms are generally derived from the economic 
‘investment’ models, while the last mechanism related to changes in cultural traits is usually 
attributed to cultural transmission hypotheses.  
Environmental risk management 
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Environmental risk management refers to the well-documented empirical finding that a 
mother’s education is inversely related to the likelihood of child mortality (37–40) and reduced child 
mortality is usually a pre-condition for (or at least a co-condition of) fertility decline. How does 
education influence child mortality? One obvious route is through improved knowledge of health, 
allowing women to improve the nutrition and survivorship of their offspring (38,41,42).  Education 
may also allow women to learn about health from other sources outside of a formal school setting, 
possibly from those in their social network or through media sources (16,43).  A third route is 
through increased household resources or wealth (44,45), making it easier for parents to prevent child 
mortality in a multitude of ways.  Finally, greater education may give women more decision-making 
power in their households, particularly in relation to decisions about seeking medical help or 
purchasing medicine for ill children (46). Reduced infant and child mortality are well-known 
predictors of fertility decline (2). While the mechanisms that produce this relationship are not well 
understood, evolutionary researchers have argued that when child mortality is extrinsic (e.g. offspring 
survival is not improved by parents’ actions), reduced parental effort and higher fertility will result, 
whereas when parents gain the ability to reduce child mortality through access to modern medicine,
parents will increase per-child investment and lower fertility will result (25,29,47,48). This leads to 
our first hypothesis (H1), that women’s education leads to reduced mortality of children, which in 
turn, reduces overall fertility.  
Human capital 
Education increases human capital (49), the skills and knowledge of an individual, which has 
multi-dimensional effects on a person’s life.  Human capital changes the market value of a person’s 
work, as people with more embodied capital are of higher monetary value in the labour market. For 
women (and sometimes men), this presents a time allocation problem, as engaging in the labour 
market may directly conflict with care of offspring, leading some women to forgo time dedicated to 
reproduction in favour of more time spent in education or employment, particularly as the 
opportunity cost of forgoing labour market opportunities increases (27,28). This leads to our second 
hypothesis (H2), that education increases the ability of a woman to enter the workforce and that 
either work or gaining an education may directly compete with childbearing activities, leading 
women to reduce fertility. 
Human capital may also change a parent’s optimal investment in offspring.  The embodied 
capital theory argues that parents with more human capital invest more in offspring than parents with 
less human capital because such investment is cheaper for them and thus returns on investment 
diminish more slowly (25,50). Additionally, human capital becomes one of a number of proxies for 
status. People may strive to educate themselves and their children to obtain status benefits, including 
more options on the mating market, or prestigious employment opportunities (which may be another 
mechanism in H2). Several authors have argued that status motivations trade off with reproduction 
(51,52), and that education may be one form that this trade-off takes. This leads to our third 
hypothesis (H3), that a woman’s education influences her access to mates (particularly mates of 
higher quality), which may allow women to marry men with more education (53), leading to reduced 
fertility in the future (e.g. 5). It is also possible that the role a husband’s education plays is not
mediated by social status but by couples marrying assortatively, so that women who gain more 
education are more likely to marry men who are also educated. An increase in husband’s education 
may in turn influence family size preferences, as we tend to see the trade-off between education and 
fertility even among men (54,55).    
Cultural Transmission 
Educated women are in privileged social positions, both to learn about ‘outside ideas’ and to 
transmit their values to other members of the population (15). Education may not just have effects at 
the individual level; evidence suggests that there are also effects of education at the community-level, 
where less educated women may be exposed to low fertility norms and exhibit low fertility outcomes 
in highly-educated communities (6). Educated women may be more likely to have access to media 
campaigns promoting smaller families. Their literacy may also give them access to print media such 
as books, pamphlets, or newspapers which may provide them access to information or influence their 
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reproductive behaviour, or they may be more likely to have access to TV or radio programs that 
contain either direct or indirect low fertility messages. Education may also improve the reliability of 
information that women receive, or their ability to evaluate the reliability of information from various 
sources. It is also possible that education provides women with larger social networks, if they are 
exposed to more or a more varied group of people by attending school or engaging in the labour 
market, than they would have if they had less or no education.  Larger or more diverse social 
networks may increase the number and kinds of behaviours and ideas that women are exposed to, 
making them aware of opportunities they might have missed if their networks were smaller or more 
homogenous. Convergence on low fertility may then be promoted by homophily in these networks, 
even in the presence of educational differences between friends (6). This leads to our fourth 
hypothesis (H4), that women with more education have social networks with lower fertility and that 
people are similar in their own reproduction to their network partners.   
Finally, education provides information about new kinds of contraceptives, which allows
people to avoid pregnancy and alter their fertility. This effect may be direct, through courses 
specifically designed to provide information, or indirect, by improving a woman’s ability to gain 
health knowledge from a source outside of school (16,43).  It is also likely that contraceptive 
information is passed through social networks (56,57). This leads to our fifth hypothesis (H5), that 
women’s education increases knowledge of novel contraceptives, increasing the likelihood of 
contraceptive use and ultimately leading to a reduction in fertility. While some have argued that 
individuals inherently want to reduce fertility and modern contraceptives give them the ability to tap 
into that previously unmet need (58), evolutionary anthropologists generally view contraceptives as a 
means to an end and want to understand what leads people to want to reduce their fertility initially.  If 
women seek out information about contraceptives because of a desire to reduce fertility, then 
contraceptive knowledge is self-selected (33). If women learn about contraceptives passively from 
family planning programs, contraceptive knowledge may not be associated with education (59), 
however women with more education may still be more likely to choose to use contraceptives to limit 
fertility.   
The Model 
Figure 1 displays a hypothesized path model including the different mediators described 
above.  We include an indicator of local mortality (to represent the mortality risk in the environment), 
work status (of the woman), husband’s education, mean fertility of a woman’s social network, and
the woman’s contraceptive knowledge. Husband’s education and women’s work status will influence 
household wealth, so we include pathways from husband’s education and women’s work to
household wealth. Finally, all of these variables may have effects on proximate contributors to
fertility, like age at first birth (where later ages at first birth are generally associated with lower 
fertility overall) or contraceptive use (where using contraceptives can reduce the risk of future births). 
These in turn may influence fertility, which we measure here as a woman’s number of live births, the 
most commonly used measure in the demographic literature. Evolutionary demographers are often 
also interested in surviving children; we re-ran our analyses using this variable and provide the 
results in the SM. 
Methods
Study Populations: Cross-cultural variation in the role of education 
We test our five hypotheses regarding the role of education on fertility decline in three 
different populations, from three different regions of the world, that are all currently undergoing 
fertility transitions. This allows us to empirically examine whether our proposed education pathways 
will be similarly influential in different regions of the world.  The three regions we compare are: 1) 
Matlab, a rural region in Bangladesh, 2) San Borja, a town in Northern Bolivia, and 3) a rural region 
of Southern Poland. These populations have varying levels of completed fertility, education, child 
mortality, female labour force participation, and contraceptive knowledge and use.  Bangladesh is an 
unusual case because fertility began to decline quite dramatically in the 1980s even though the 
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country was very poor and had high child mortality (60,61). Some have argued that Bangladesh’s 
fertility decline was the result of highly effective family planning programs (60), though it is unclear 
if these motivations outweighed the importance of economic change (5). The rural Polish sample, on 
the other hand, has higher fertility than expected given the country’s total fertility rate (TFR), level of 
wealth, and very low infant mortality rate (6). Bolivia is one of the poorest nations in South America 
and San Borja, specifically, has higher fertility than both rural Poland and Matlab.     
While infant mortality may be a mediator of the relationship between education and fertility, 
it likely plays a smaller role in contexts where child mortality has already declined to low levels 
(particularly where it has declined dramatically before we see significant changes in fertility 
strategy). If almost all children survive infancy, then differences in fertility strategies cannot be a 
reflection of response to mortality risk. Based on data from San Borja, infant mortality rates have 
declined from approximately 50 per 1,000 live births before 1990 to 20 per 1,000 live births since 
2000.  Of course, infant deaths may have been underreported, particularly for deaths that occurred 
further in the past.  Data from all of Bolivia suggests an infant mortality rate of 86 per 1,000 live 
births in 1990 and a rate of 40 per 1,000 live births in 2008 (62). Infant mortality rates in Matlab, 
Bangladesh, averaged around 120 children per 1,000 live births through 1978, since which time they 
have declined by over 75% and in 2010 were between 25 and 35 infant deaths per 1,000 live births 
(63). In Poland, under-five mortality rates have recently declined from ~21 deaths per 1,000 live 
births in 1980 to ~5 deaths per 1,000 in 2010 (64). However, infant and neonatal mortality rates are 
higher than those in other developed EU countries, mostly due to a higher rate of premature births, 
which are attributed to relatively poorer living and health conditions in Poland (65,66). 
All three sites have experienced rapid declines in fertility over the past several decades. In the 
Matlab area total fertility fell from 6.7 children per woman in 1966 to 2.6 children per woman in 
2010 (63). Bolivia has the highest fertility rate in South America; the total fertility rate was 
approximately 3.3 in 2011, but had fallen from a total fertility rate of 6.6 in 1970 (67). Poland’s total 
fertility rate in 2012 was 1.3, having fallen from a total fertility rate of 3.0 in 1960. Our San Borja 
and rural Poland samples have higher fertility than the average fertility rate for the country at large.  
Matlab has higher fertility than urban areas of Bangladesh, but likely has lower fertility than other 
rural areas.  At the time the data were collected, post-reproductive women in our sample had on 
average 5.1 live births  in Matlab, 6.2 in San Borja, and 3.8 in rural Poland.  
The Matlab study area  includes ~200,000 people on whom detailed demographic data has 
been collected since 1966 as part of the ICDDR,B Health and Demographic Surveillance System 
(HDSS) (5). The data used here are from a random sample of 944 women from the Matlab study area 
on whom Shenk and Towner collected data in 2010; 796 women have all data necessary for this 
analysis.  The San Borja data comes from interviews conducted in 2008 with ~500 women (for 
additional details, see 33). The rural Poland data was collected in 2009 and 2010 on 1,995 women in 
22 communities (for additional details, see 68). Each of these datasets has generally comparable 
information about a woman’s reproductive history, individual characteristics, and community 
information.
Data Analysis 
We use structural equation modelling (SEM) in STATA (v. 13) using the maximum 
likelihood with missing values method to analyse path models for all three sites (for additional 
details, see Supplementary Material). Structural equation modelling estimates a series of regression 
models to obtain direct, indirect and total effects of independent variables on the outcome of interest, 
total number of live births (69).  Additionally, structural equation modelling allows us to compare the 
relative strengths of mediating variables (as all coefficients presented are standardized). We used the 
full model and eliminated pathways that indicated poor fit until we had the best fit models.  To 
optimize model fit, we maximized CFI (comparative fit index) and minimized RMSEA (root mean 
square error of approximation) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion). A good fit of the data is 
indicated by a CFI greater than 0.95 and RMSEA less than 0.06 (70). SEM cannot establish causality 
and our results should be interpreted as correlations; however, it does allow us to determine the best 
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fit of our hypothesized causal model. To test the robustness of our SEM results, we also conduct 
Poisson regressions with robust standard errors on number of births including education and 
mediating factors.   
Variable Operationalization 
The dependent variable of interest is fertility, measured as the number of live births. We have 
also included results (in the Supplement) with number of surviving offspring as our dependent 
variable.   
The independent variable is education, which is measured as an ordinal variable on a scale of 
1 to 5, which varies slightly by context.  This categorization allows us to compare the relative levels 
of education within a context and to split up the variation that occurs in education across the sites.  
For details by site, see Supplementary Material.  
Our mediating variables include local mortality, women’s work, mean fertility of one’s social 
network (measured as both friend network and sibling network) husband’s education (same 
categorisation as women’s education), the use and knowledge of contraceptives, and age the age of 
first birth.  We control for household wealth and age throughout the analyses.  These are measured in 
slightly different ways in each site.  Please refer to the Supplementary Material for further details.  
Results 
We present the descriptive statistics for all independent, dependent and control variables in 
Supplementary Material Table S1.  In Figure 2, we present the relationship between education and 
number of births by age cohort.  This figure demonstrates that, as expected, in all three contexts 
higher levels of education are associated with reduced numbers of live births.  This graph also 
demonstrates that the highest fertility is observed in San Borja, with Matlab and rural Poland having 
similar fertility across the different age cohorts.  Supplementary Material Table S2 provides a 
summary of results organized by hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Women’s education leads to reduced mortality of children, which in turn reduces 
overall fertility.  
Figure 3 presents the results of the structural equation model of the potential pathways 
between education and number of births (for additional details on the results of the SEM model, see 
Supplementary Material Table S3). The coefficients represent standardised coefficients showing the 
amount (measured in standard deviations) the particular variable is expected to change as another 
variable increases by one standard deviation. Across the three sites, there is evidence that a woman’s 
education level is negatively associated with the local mortality of children, but local mortality is
only associated with number of births in Matlab and San Borja, where women in areas of high 
mortality have more births, as expected.  In Poland, local mortality is not a strong predictor of 
fertility or age at first birth and was eliminated from the model.  Given that Matlab and San Borja 
both have relatively high infant mortality rates compared to rural Poland, we expect mortality to play 
a larger role in predicting fertility.  In rural Poland, infant mortality rates are quite low with little 
variation between families, so fertility does not appear to co-vary with this factor.  Table 1 gives the 
results of the Poisson models for each site, which are consistent with results from the SEM.  
Hypothesis 2: Education increases a woman’s ability to enter the workforce and that work may 
directly compete with childbearing activities, leading women to reduce fertility.  
Evidence from the SEM suggests that education is a significant predictor of women’s working 
status, where, as predicted, women with more education are more likely to work.  In both San Borja 
and Poland, this work has a significantly positive association with household wealth.  In Matlab, this 
is not the case, possibly because so few women are employed. Except for a few highly educated 
women, those who do work tend to come from poorer households (and work only when it is 
necessary). In all three contexts, women who work tend to have later ages at first birth (or possibly 
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women who have later first births are more likely to work, the direction of causality is difficult to 
determine). While age at first birth tends to be negatively associated with overall fertility, and 
therefore women’s work has an indirect effect on number of births (through its effect on age at first 
birth), women’s work does not have a significant direct effect on number of births in either San Borja 
or Matlab. In rural Poland, there is a positive effect of women’s work on number of births after 
controlling for the negative effect through age at first birth.   
We had anticipated that the direct effect of women’s work on fertility might vary by context, 
since women in Poland and San Borja, but not Matlab, tend to work, but this was not the case.  
Across all three contexts, education influences the likelihood of working, and work delays the age at 
first birth, but work only has a direct effect on number of births in Poland, and this was not in the 
predicted direction. There, women who work have more children. Our Poisson model does not show 
any significant effect of women’s work on number of births in any of the three contexts, and for rural 
Poland, this difference is probably due to the mediation effects that the SEM can better pick up on 
(i.e. the different pathways between education, women’s work, age at first birth, and number of 
births). In the Poisson model for Poland, if age at first birth is excluded, women’s work has a 
significant positive effect on number of births, but the effect becomes non-significant with the 
inclusion of age at first birth. 
Hypothesis 3: Women’s education is correlated with husband’s education, and increases in husband’s 
education reduce fertility. 
Across all three contexts, women’s education is significantly correlated with husband’s
education.  Husband’s education also predicts number of births in rural Poland and Matlab, with men 
with high levels of education tending to have wives with fewer births, but there is no effect in San 
Borja after controlling for the respondent’s education and the effect through wealth. This result is 
replicated in the Poisson regression model in Table 1. This suggests that in San Borja women’s 
education plays a larger role in predicting the number births than husband’s education does, and any 
effect of husband’s education is mediated through household wealth.  
Hypothesis 4: Women with more education have social networks with lower fertility and people are 
similar in their own reproduction to their network partners.   
We measured social networks as both a woman’s friend network (or her local community in 
Matlab) and her sibling set.  Across all three sites, women with more education have friends and 
siblings with lower fertility.  Friends’ and siblings’ fertility significantly predicts number of births in 
Matlab and Poland, where having social networks with higher fertility is positively associated with 
own reproduction.  Interestingly, social network fertility is not a significant predictor of own fertility 
in San Borja (the best-fitting model does include friends’ fertility, but the p-value > 0.10).  The 
Poisson regression provides consistent results, where both friends’ fertility and sibling fertility have 
positive effects on total number of births for Matlab and Poland, but in San Borja, only friends’ 
fertility has a significant effect.   
Hypothesis 5: Women’s education increases women’s knowledge of novel contraceptives, increasing 
the likelihood of contraceptive use and ultimately leading to a reduction in fertility. 
The knowledge of contraceptives was only recorded in San Borja and Poland.  In both 
contexts, women with higher levels of education learned about contraceptives earlier in life.  In 
Matlab, where all women of the same age have equal access to contraceptive knowledge, education is 
associated with an increased likelihood of contraceptive use. Additionally, in San Borja and Poland 
learning about contraceptives earlier in life is associated with earlier adoption of contraceptives.  
These results are all as expected.  However, in both San Borja and Poland, where we have data on 
age at first contraceptive use, an earlier age at contraceptive use is correlated with an earlier age at 
first birth.  In Matlab, women who adopt contraceptives also have an earlier age at first birth.  These 
results may seem counter-intuitive, but may indicate that women in these contexts usually use 
contraceptives responsively to space births and/or stop reproducing. Nonetheless, in both Poland and 
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San Borja, earlier ages of contraceptive adoption are associated with fewer numbers of births. In 
contrast, in Matlab using contraceptives is associated with higher fertility.   
In the Poisson models, we compare those women who ever used contraceptives with those 
who did not across the three sites. Any contraceptive use is not associated with number of births in
rural Poland (but see 32), but in both San Borja and Matlab using contraceptives is associated with 
more births. While researchers studying developed nations with wage-labour economies often expect 
contraceptive use to delay or reduce births, in higher-fertility contexts it is likely that women who 
have attained their desired family size are more likely to use contraceptives to stop reproducing, or 
indeed, to achieve higher fertility (71).   
Discussion 
As predicted, local mortality is a mediator of the relationship between education and fertility, 
and was most important in Matlab and San Borja, where infant mortality is higher and more varied 
than in Poland. This suggests that mortality rates can influence fertility when both are declining 
simultaneously; where mortality has declined before we see fertility change, mortality may have little 
impact on individual-level fertility. We measured local mortality slightly differently in each context, 
which makes it hard to know if these differences are the result of true effects or differences in our 
measurements. Nonetheless, in those contexts with higher mortality there appears to be a greater 
effect on the relationship between education and fertility than in those contexts with lower mortality. 
The reverse is also possible; reductions in child mortality may lead to increased education rates.  
Women’s work mediates education and reduced fertility relatively consistently across 
contexts, though not in the way we predicted. Work was not associated with total number of births in
San Borja and Matlab, and was positively associated with births in rural Poland, but work did delay 
age at first birth, indirectly impacting overall fertility. In Poland, work status indicates whether a 
woman ever worked; in Matlab it indicates either currently working or working before retirement. It
is therefore hard to know if work status predicts age at first birth or the other way around. In San 
Borja, work status is measured at the time of first birth, so is more likely to have a direct impact on 
first birth. Other measures of work status in San Borja, like the percentage of a woman’s reproductive 
span that she worked, were not better predictors of number of births or timing of first birth (results 
not shown). 
It is surprising that women’s work does not have a direct negative effect on fertility across 
these sites even though it is an important predictor of fertility in many settings (for example 
27,28,72,73).  It is likely that in these transitioning contexts, women's work has been integrated into 
their childcare responsibilities and/or women have access to much more significant levels of allocare 
from kin than is true in long-industrialized societies or urban areas.  Women in Matlab, Bangladesh, 
for example, usually live in baris with several patrilocal households and may also live close to their 
natal kin (e.g. 74).  In San Borja, approximately 91% of women either do not engage in the labour 
market or can combine employment with childcare, by, for example, working at home or running a 
store (33). In Poland, women frequently combine farm and off-farm work (75), and live close to their 
kin. In some regions of the world, like rural Bangladesh, women rarely work outside the home (only 
5% of women in the Matlab sample reported ever working in the wage labour market).  In these 
cases, there are few opportunity costs of women’s work to constrain reproduction, though education 
may provide women with payoffs on the mating market instead of the labour market.  
Husband’s education mediated education and fertility in rural Poland and Matlab, where a
woman’s education is correlated with her husband’s education, which in turn has a negative effect on 
the number of births. In San Borja, a woman and her husband’s education are highly correlated, but 
after controlling for the woman’s education, husband’s education does not predict number of births. 
Husband’s education may have a smaller influence on fertility in San Borja because of higher divorce 
rates (approximately 33% of marriages end in divorce 76), while divorce rates in Matlab and Poland 
are much lower (63). By examining fertility outcomes for an individual woman, her current 
husband’s education may not correspond to her lifetime fertility decisions if their relationship has not 
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extended throughout her reproductive career, which may influence our San Borja results more than 
the other contexts.  
We might expect that education influences household wealth as well, which in turn may affect 
fertility. As recent work has demonstrated, wealth and status may be measured in many different 
ways, each having a different effect on fertility (5,68,77,78). In rural Poland, there appears to be an 
opposite effect of material wealth and husband’s education, where greater wealth reduces age at first 
birth and increases fertility, while increased levels of husband’s education reduces fertility.  This is 
one of the benefits of using structural equation modelling, to detangle these differing effects (see also 
68 where multiple measures of wealth and status, as well as interactions between them, are 
examined).  The results from Poland support the theoretical predictions from Kaplan and Lancaster’s 
embodied capital model, where education reduces fertility as parents invest more in each offspring, 
but controlling for education, wealth has a positive effect on the overall budget of investments 
resulting in increased fertility (50). Colleran and colleagues also show that these two different factors 
interact, and so should not be interpreted in isolation (68). In San Borja, greater household wealth is 
associated with later ages at first birth and fewer births, exactly the opposite of what we see in rural 
Poland. In Matlab, the two measures of wealth have differing effects.  If the household owns land, 
there is an association with earlier age at first birth and higher fertility, but household income has 
only a marginally significant negative effect on age at first birth and no significant effect on fertility.  
This is consistent with previous findings that different types of wealth can vary in their effects on 
fertility, and especially that farming wealth is often associated with higher fertility (e.g. 5,75).     
We found the most consistent support for the idea that one’s social network is influenced by 
one’s level of education, which in turn influences one’s number of births. Both friends’ fertility and 
siblings’ fertility are indicators of overall fertility in rural Poland and Matlab.  In San Borja, friends’ 
fertility tends to be associated with number of offspring, while siblings’ fertility is not. Sibling 
fertility may be confounded by culturally and genetically heritable aspects of fertility behaviour,
along with ecological similarity, whereas non-kin friend networks are only confounded by ecological 
similarity (although, in rural Poland, almost half of all network partners were not residence in the 
same community as ego (6)). Non-kin networks may therefore provide better evidence for the 
influence of one’s social network on fertility.  In all three sites, friends’ fertility has a similar or 
larger effect size than siblings’ fertility, suggesting that social networks play an important role in 
fertility transition.  It is possible that people seek out friends with similar fertility to their own, 
resulting in a reverse causation problem, but evidence suggests this is not the case.  In rural Poland, 
friendships usually began well before reproduction took place, with mean network durations of 23 
years (6).  In Matlab, the social network actually measures the fertility of the entire bari, or 
patrilineal neighbourhood, making reverse causation much less of a problem. Unfortunately, the 
interpretation of this variable is ambiguous, as the relationships we observe between social networks 
and fertility may be mediated by either social influence or by shared ecology. Our analyses do not 
allow us to differentiate between these two mechanisms, but future work may allow the relationship 
to be unpacked. 
By comparing the different measures of contraceptive use we can observe that how 
contraceptives are operationalized likely influences inferences about their effect on fertility (32). In 
San Borja and rural Poland, where we used age at contraceptive uptake, a later age at adoption of 
contraception is associated with higher fertility. In Matlab, we operationalized this as ‘ever using 
contraceptives’, and found a positive correlation with fertility; where women used contraceptives, 
they had higher fertility (this effect was replicated in San Borja in the Poisson model). This seems 
counter-intuitive, but as demonstrated by other researchers, in contexts of early fertility transition, 
many women use contraceptives to either space or end their reproductive career once they have 
achieved desired family size and in fact, women who were ever-users of contraception often ended 
up with higher completed fertility (34,79,80).  Use of contraceptives may thus indicate women who 
already have many children and/or have higher parity for age and would like to prevent future births. 
This indicates that knowing the timing of contraceptive uptake (or duration of its use) is an important 
determinant of whether contraceptives will be associated with higher or lower fertility.   
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In rural Poland, using any contraceptives (as modelled in the Poisson model) is not associated 
with number of births. This may be because women of all ages are included here, and there are cohort 
differences in both the methods being used by older and younger women, and the changing 
reproductive preferences that the cross-section captures. For example, women in the youngest cohort 
(under age 30), have lower fertility if they have ever used contraceptives, while women in an older 
cohort (30-39), have higher fertility if they have ever used contraceptives, and post-reproductive 
women have fewer children again. We operationalized contraceptive use to include both ‘modern’ 
and ‘traditional’ methods in rural Poland, but we might expect education to differentially influence 
knowledge about novel/modern versus traditional contraceptives, influencing their subsequent use. If 
we restrict our analysis to modern contraceptive use, we still find that education influences age at 
contraceptive knowledge which in turn mediates age at use of novel contraceptives. However, the 
pathways to reproductive outcomes now differ: age at modern contraceptive use much more strongly 
mediates number of births (the effect size is doubled), and more weakly mediates age at first birth 
(the effect size is halved).  This suggests that while education has a comparable effect on the age 
women are learning about and using different kinds of contraceptives, the age at which modern 
methods are first used has a larger effect on reducing births. Different operationalizations of 
contraceptive methods are affected by different predictors in this population (32), which further 
highlights the fact that contraceptives are used and diffused in a variety of ways, depending on the 
context. 
Finally, given that the Matlab region has a very effective family planning program, where 
almost all women are taught about contraceptives, the level of knowledge likely has little effect on 
fertility outcomes. This might have been an important variable at the beginning of the family 
planning program initiative, but once the community is saturated with knowledge and access, fertility
differences are not likely driven by contraceptive knowledge but instead by individual strategies and 
decisions regarding fertility. This clearly shows how the diffusion of information is not equivalent to 
the diffusion of behaviour (32,81) .
We should note that while contraceptive use is itself a proximate mechanism of fertility 
decline, its diffusion is a useful proxy for the decision-mechanisms that underlie its adoption. It is
also debated whether access to new methods is a purely exogenous factor in fertility transitions. 
Governments tend to initiate family planning programs non-randomly and may tailor their program to 
areas where people have high numbers of offspring and may be interested in learning ways to reduce 
their fertility (82,83). Women who want to reduce their fertility may be more likely to seek out 
information on contraceptives, making the effect of contraceptives endogenous (for alternative 
interpretations of information seeking and social contagion, see 32,84). Understanding the links
between contraceptive knowledge and use may help us understand what predicts who learns (or is 
taught) about contraceptives. In the end though, it is the motivation to reduce fertility, not the means 
by which it is achieved, that is of theoretical interest to most evolutionary anthropologists. 
There is evidence from our analyses that the effect of education on fertility is likely mediated 
by several different factors, including local mortality rates (where mortality varies), husband’s 
education, wealth, contraceptive use, and the mean fertility of a woman’s social network.  But even 
after controlling for these potential pathways, education has an additional direct effect on fertility in
rural Poland and San Borja, suggesting that education matters beyond the covariates included here. 
For example, community-level education has been shown to matter over and above individual 
education in the Polish context (6). This may be driven by higher rates of horizontal relative to 
vertical cultural transmission (see 15) in communities with higher average education, or by 
unobserved characteristics of particular contexts that jointly determine higher education and lower 
fertility. Education also has a significant direct effect on age at first birth, where women with more 
education tend to have later ages at first birth in all three contexts. This may be partially explained by 
women remaining in school and tending to delay family formation while they are completing their 
education, but in San Borja and Matlab where women rarely achieve higher education, education 
may delay reproduction for reasons other than simply the conflict between going to school and 
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starting a family. In Matlab, for example, women with more education are able to marry higher-status 
grooms and it may take time to find and negotiate such matches.
Conclusions 
This paper highlights the great importance of comparative work in unpacking the dynamics of 
fertility decline cross-culturally.  We see several similarities across three very distinct field sites on 
three continents, suggesting that common elements are important in the demographic transition cross-
culturally, and especially in the way that fertility decline is mediated by education. Yet we also see 
distinctions between field sites, suggesting that local ecologies play a tangible role in the impact of 
education and how fertility decline unfolds.  
Taken together, these findings corroborate suggestions (5,16,17,33) that education is such a 
powerful cross-cultural predictor of fertility decline because it operates through multiple pathways.  
It also has effects at multiple levels of analysis (6). While not every pathway may be important in
every ecological context, more than one pathway is likely to matter in most cultures, leading to 
strong cross-cultural effects of women’s education on fertility despite variation in local 
circumstances. More broadly, these results reinforce the idea that the demographic transition is both a 
global and a local phenomenon—with a number of potential causal pathways that may act across 
many societies, despite the fact that only some of them may be active in any particular society. 
Finally, our results suggest that a combination of both economic and cultural transmission models are 
needed to explain fertility decline.   
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Tables 
Table 1 
Poland San Borja Matlab 
Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value 
Contraceptive Use (ref = never used) 
  Used Contraceptives 0.019 0.036 0.595 0.097 0.052 0.064 0.129 0.062 0.037 
  Unknown contraceptive use 0.252 0.159 0.113 -0.114 0.079 0.146 
Sibling fertility 0.031 0.012 0.010 0.026 0.019 0.155 0.033 0.013 0.009 
Friends' fertility 0.033 0.012 0.005 0.038 0.017 0.029 0.124 0.021 <0.001 
Women's work 0.049 0.044 0.270 0.027 0.067 0.683 -0.083 0.063 0.184 
Child mortality -1.155 0.854 0.177 0.659 0.246 0.007 0.026 0.007 <0.001 
Wealth 0.048 0.015 0.002 -0.077 0.028 0.006 
Income (log) 0.012 0.015 0.447 
Owns Land 0.066 0.042 0.115 
Husband's education (ref = lowest level) 
2 -0.123 0.101 0.223 -0.190 0.241 0.431 0.003 0.037 0.930 
3 -0.205 0.106 0.053 -0.171 0.246 0.487 -0.092 0.041 0.026 
4 -0.299 0.109 0.006 -0.237 0.242 0.327 -0.136 0.066 0.040 
5 -0.307 0.122 0.012 -0.386 0.262 0.141 -0.177 0.106 0.095 
Women's education (ref = lowest level) 
2 0.082 0.099 0.409 -0.006 0.074 0.931 0.043 0.034 0.197 
3 0.123 0.105 0.243 -0.152 0.068 0.025 0.014 0.051 0.790 
4 0.015 0.108 0.890 -0.178 0.089 0.045 -0.259 0.153 0.092 
5 -0.110 0.113 0.329 -0.139 0.148 0.349 -0.002 0.186 0.992 
Age at first birth -0.037 0.004 <0.001 -0.039 0.008 <0.001 -0.022 0.009 0.013 
Age 0.013 0.001 <0.001 0.024 0.003 <0.001 0.022 0.002 <0.001 
Constant 1.324 0.176 <0.001 1.173 0.255 <0.001 -0.047 0.317 0.882 
n 1337 285 577 
Note: SE represents standard error. Bold values represent p<0.05. 
Figure and table captions 
Figure 1: Hypothesized path model of the effects of education on number of births
Figure 2: The effect of education on number of births (controlling for age category) in Matlab, San Borja, and 
Poland. Education categories range from 1 to 5.  In Matlab and San Borja, 1 = no education, 2 = low primary 
education, 3 = high primary/low secondary education, 4 = completed secondary school, 5=tertiary education.  
In Poland, 1= some primary, 2=full primary, 3=vocational, 4 = secondary, 5=tertiary. Error bars represent 
standard errors.
Figure 3: Structural equation model of the pathways between education and fertility in a) rural Poland, b) San 
Borja, and c) Matlab.  All models include age as a control (not shown, see Supplementary Material Table 3). ^
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Table 1: Poisson regression analyses predicting total live births in Poland, San Borja, and Matlab 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized path model of the effects of education on number of births
Figure 2: The effect of education on number of births (controlling for age category) in Matlab, San Borja, and 
Poland. Education categories range from 1 to 5.  In Matlab and San Borja, 1 = no education, 2 = low primary 
education, 3 = high primary/low secondary education, 4 = completed secondary school, 5=tertiary education.  
In Poland, 1= some primary, 2=full primary, 3=vocational, 4 = secondary, 5=tertiary. Error bars represent 
standard errors.
Figure 3: Structural equation model of the pathways between education and fertility in a) rural Poland, b) San 
Borja, and c) Matlab.  All models include age as a control (not shown, see Supplementary Material Table 3). ^
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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